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EXPLORING EVIL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE: 
A CRITICAL NOTICE OF PETER VAN INWAGEN’S 
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
John Martin Fischer and Neal A. Tognazzini
In his recent book on the problem of evil, Peter van Inwagen argues that both 
the global and local arguments from evil are failures. In this paper, we engage 
van Inwagen’s book at two main points. First, we consider his understanding 
of what it takes for a philosophical argument to succeed. We argue that while 
his criterion for success is interesting and helpful, there is good reason to 
think it is too stringent. Second, we consider his responses to the global and 
local arguments from evil. We argue that although van Inwagen may have 
adequately responded to each of these arguments, his discussion points us to 
a third argument from evil to which he has yet to provide a response.
Introduction
This book1 presents somewhat revised versions of the Giﬀ ord Lectures, de-
livered by Peter van Inwagen at the University of St. Andrews in 2003. The 
lectures provide a systematic response to various versions of the problem 
of evil. The book is quite simply delightful to read. It is beautifully writ-
ten, and full of ingenious, subtle, and insightful argumentation. The book 
displays Peter van Inwagen’s signature combination of elegant and plain 
prose with philosophical sophistication and rigor. Anyone interested in 
the problem of evil should read this book. In our view, it contains much 
good sense, not a litt le wry (and slightly curmudgeonly) humor, and some 
novel insights into this central problem of philosophy of religion. In what 
follows, we shall begin by discussing van Inwagen’s fascinating and sug-
gestive views about philosophical methodology. We shall then turn to the 
global and local arguments from evil. We argue that although van Inwa-
gen’s responses to the global and local arguments from evil may succeed, 
his discussion points us to a third type of argument from evil (in addition 
to the global and local varieties) against which neither of his responses to 
the arguments he considers will work. The upshot will be that van Inwa-
gen has yet to put the problem of evil to rest, since there is an important 
argument from evil he has yet to address.
I. Philosophical Methodology and Philosophical Failure
Chapter 3 is entitled “Philosophical Failure,” but it is really about philo-
sophical methodology in general, or perhaps more precisely, about how 
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best to assess and also to develop philosophical argumentation. Van Inwa-
gen begins by rejecting a model of philosophical argumentation quite simi-
lar to what Robert Nozick has called “coercive philosophy”; on this model, 
one seeks to provide knockdown arguments from indisputable premises. 
As regards this sort of model, van Inwagen points out (p. 37) that Nozick 
said that when he was young he thought that a philosophical argument is 
adequate only if anyone who understood the premises but did not accept 
the conclusion would die! (One imagines the brain exploding.)
Van Inwagen goes on to consider a second model. On this view, philo-
sophical argumentation can be thought of as a kind of debate between 
two parties who have opposite views about the issue under consideration, 
where the goal of each is to convince the other to give up his position 
and adopt the competing view. (A weaker requirement would be to con-
vince the other party to the debate to switch from accepting the competing 
view to agnosticism; van Inwagen doesn’t explicitly consider this possi-
bility. An even weaker requirement—or family of requirements—would 
be to get the other party to decrease to some degree his confi dence in his 
view. These models might be fruitful to consider.) So suppose the issue 
is whether causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. 
Here we are to envisage an idealized debate (some of the conditions of 
idealization are discussed on pp. 42–43) between a compatibilist and an 
incompatibilist, where the compatibilist seeks to convince the incompati-
bilist to adopt compatibilism, and the incompatibilist seeks to convince 
the compatibilist to adopt incompatibilism. The argument oﬀ ered (say) 
by the compatibilist is deemed successful only if the incompatibilist is 
persuaded to adopt compatibilism.
Van Inwagen rejects this second model for the same reason he rejects the 
fi rst, saying that it places the bar too high: “I very much doubt whether any 
argument, or any set of independent arguments, for any substantive philo-
sophical conclusion has the power to turn a determined opponent of that 
conclusion, however rational, into an adherent of that conclusion” (p. 43).
Van Inwagen prefers a third model, according to which we understand 
philosophical argumentation as like an idealized debate between propo-
nents of competing positions, where the goal is not to convert the other 
debater, but to convince an idealized “agnostic”—a person who is “neu-
tral” in the sense that he has no particular antecedent inclination to accept 
the relevant position. Here the two debaters address a third party, rather 
than each other, and the goal is not “conversion,” but securing “convic-
tion,” as it were. Van Inwagen contends that this weaker model is more 
reasonable, and that it has some advantages with respect to understand-
ing issues about begging the question and the burden of proof. 
We fi nd van Inwagen’s proposal highly att ractive, and we agree with 
him that it is preferable to the fi rst two. In previous work, one of us (Fisch-
er) has suggested something similar. That is, Fischer has suggested that 
(for example) a compatibilist understand his arguments as directed to 
a fair-minded, reasonable person without a prior commitment to either 
compatibilism or incompatibilism.2 (In recent work Haji and McKenna 
and also Mele hold a similar view.3) In certain debates one oft en reads or 
hears the following sort of reply to a proposed argument or consideration: 
“but an incompatibilist would reject that . . . .” It is as if a compatibilist 
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may only present considerations and arguments that would not be re-
jected by someone with an antecedent and iron-clad commitment to in-
compatibilism! But this really sets the bar too high; clearly, if we accepted 
this sort of requirement, no philosophical progress could be made with 
respect to substantive and contentious philosophical issues. We think it is 
quite helpful to point out that the arguments and considerations should 
be addressed to a neutral agnostic, rather than a committ ed opponent. As 
van Inwagen points out, adopting this model might well result in diﬀ erent 
views about what is argumentatively permissible, as opposed to question-
begging or otherwise illicit, and where the burden of proof lies.
Van Inwagen goes on to argue that even on the somewhat more per-
missive third model, not only is the atheist’s argument based on evil a 
failure, but all arguments for substantive, interesting philosophical theses 
will turn out to be failures. We wonder why van Inwagen thinks it is a 
fatal criticism of the fi rst two models that they would have it that no philo-
sophical arguments are successes, but not a problem for his favored model 
that it also has this implication. This is at least a prima facie problem—or 
puzzle—for van Inwagen. Perhaps van Inwagen believes that the fi rst two 
models set the bar unreasonably high so that it would be unreasonably 
hard to meet their criteria for success, whereas the third model sets the 
bar at just the right height—but that even so no philosophical argument 
for an interesting, substantive thesis is successful. But it does seem at least 
to vitiate the interest of van Inwagen’s claim—that the various versions of 
the problem of evil are failures as philosophical arguments—that all philo-
sophical arguments turn out to be failures (on his account).4 So perhaps 
it would be worth considering another model (or family of models), by 
reference to which it would turn out that some (but not all) philosophical 
arguments for the relevant sorts of theses are indeed successful (or at least 
successful to certain degrees). 
Consider a model that adopts the assumptions of van Inwagen’s third 
model—we have a debate addressed to a neutral agnostic (with respect to 
the view under dispute). But here success does not require that the neutral 
agnostic actually adopt the relevant view; what is required is simply that 
the agnostic’s inclination to adopt the thesis increases (perhaps to some 
threshold amount). Here we can again imagine a family of diﬀ erent views; 
the weakest view would be that success simply requires some increase 
in the agnostic’s inclination to accept the relevant view, whereas stronger 
views would require a range of more signifi cant increases in the strength 
of the inclination to accept the view in question. On this sort of model, we 
presumably could say that some (but certainly not all) philosophical argu-
ments for contentious, substantive positions are successful. 
Van Inwagen is aware of the possibility of models similar to the one we 
have suggested above; indeed, he says:
I would suppose that most real agnostics, most actual people who 
do profess and call themselves agnostics, are not neutral agnostics. 
Most agnostics I have discussed these matt ers with think that it’s 
prett y improbable that there’s a God. Their relation to the proposi-
tion that God exists is very much like my relation to the proposition 
that there are intelligent non-human beings inhabiting some planet 
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within 10,000 light-years of the Earth. And this consideration sug-
gests a possible objection to my defi nition of philosophical success. 
Call those agnostics who think that it’s very improbable that there is 
a God weighted agnostics. An argument for the non-existence of God, 
the argument from evil for example, might be a failure by my crite-
rion because it lacked the power to transform ideal (and hence neu-
tral) agnostics into atheists. But it might, consistently with that, have 
the power to transform neutral agnostics into weighted agnostics. If 
it does, isn’t it rather hard on it to call it a failure? (p. 50)
Van Inwagen says that he would not object to revising his model to allow 
for success in the case described (in which the neutral agnostic becomes 
a weighted agnostic). But he goes on to contend that if the considerations 
he invokes in seeking to show that the argument from evil is incapable 
of turning neutral agnostics into atheists are persuasive, they would be 
equally persuasive in showing that the argument from evil is incapable of 
turning neutral agnostics into weighted agnostics (p. 51).
But note that even van Inwagen’s permitt ed revision is signifi cantly 
diﬀ erent from the model we sketched above, insofar as our model does 
not require for success that a neutral agnostic become a weighted agnostic; 
aft er all, a weighted agnostic, according to van Inwagen, believes that it is 
“very improbable” that God exists. All that is required on our suggested 
model is that a neutral agnostic become inclined to some degree (which 
may fall considerably short of the threshold posited by van Inwagen) to 
accept the relevant position (say, atheism). Given this important diﬀ er-
ence, even if van Inwagen’s conditional is true (that if the argument from 
evil is incapable of transforming a neutral agnostic into an atheist, then it 
is also incapable of transforming a neutral agnostic into a weighted ag-
nostic), it would not follow that if the argument from evil is incapable of 
transforming a neutral agnostic into an atheist, then it is also incapable of 
increasing the inclination of a neutral agnostic to accept atheism (to the 
relevant degree).
Why exactly would we want a model by reference to which we could 
say that some (but not all) philosophical arguments for interesting, sub-
stantive theses are actually successful (as opposed to “close to success-
ful”)? We suppose this may depend to some extent on one’s temperament 
or philosophical personality. Some philosophers might well think that it is 
accurate to describe all philosophical arguments for substantive, conten-
tious theses as failures, although perhaps they may invoke a model like 
ours to say that some arguments are “bett er” than others, or come closer 
to success than others, or perhaps are “partial” successes (to one degree or 
another). Others will be a bit less dour about the possibility of philosophi-
cal success. One might think that the interesting philosophical issues are 
so incredibly diﬃ  cult, we should consider ourselves successful if we could 
change the inclination of an idealized neutral agnostic even a litt le bit. 
(And note that this change is in the context of a debate where the propo-
nent of the opposing view can mount a vigorous argument of his own.) 
There are of course various problems for the very sketchy proposal 
we have made. We simply note that it applies most naturally to highly 
contentious philosophical theses, where it is plausible that an ideal 
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agnostic would in fact be neutral. If one considers theses which are in dis-
pute but whose objective probability of truth is relatively high, then even 
a very uninspiring argument would presumably change (signifi cantly) the 
inclination of an idealized unweighted agnostic. This suggests that perhaps 
in general the requirement should be that the argument move an ideal 
agnostic who has an inclination to accept the relevant view that matches 
(in a suitable sense) the objective probability of truth of the relevant view. 
But we will simply follow van Inwagen in noting this problem without 
addressing it in detail (p. 49).
There is no doubt that van Inwagen provides us with a striking and 
illuminating model of philosophical argumentation. We have suggested 
some possible revisions to this essentially “forensic” approach. It should 
perhaps be noted that this family of models might capture only part of the 
picture here.5 That is, it might be that philosophical argumentation is more 
heterogeneous than what is suggested by the forensic model (or even the 
family of such models) sketched above. For example, perhaps some philo-
sophical arguments are “successful” in virtue of making us (or many of 
us—or some of us) see a certain debate in a diﬀ erent way—as structured 
in a diﬀ erent way, or as requiring diﬀ erent presuppositions from what 
we had antecedently believed. Or maybe an argument can be successful 
by helping us to tease out certain distinctions, or clarify certain concepts, 
or encouraging us to think in new directions about an old problem. We 
suppose that an argument could be successful simply in virtue of helping 
us to see the force of some puzzle or problem. It is not clear that it is help-
ful to seek to explicate all philosophical argumentation by reference to 
one model or family of models—to do so might seem to force a disparate 
range of phenomena into a Procrustean bed.6
II. The Global and Local Arguments from Evil
Let’s move on to consider van Inwagen’s treatment of the problem of evil 
in particular. In his book he departs from the usual taxonomy that distin-
guishes the logical threat from the evidential threat and replaces it with 
one that distinguishes between the global argument from evil and various 
local arguments from evil. Although it isn’t altogether clear why van Inwa-
gen fi nds the logical/evidential distinction useless, he makes it clear that 
he does fi nd it useless (p. 8).7 We agree that the distinction he uses instead is 
indeed useful. Roughly speaking, the global argument from evil purports 
to disprove the existence of God by pointing out that there is much evil 
in the world, whereas any particular local argument from evil purports to 
disprove the existence of God by pointing out that our world contains a 
particular instance (and most oft en a particularly egregious instance) of evil. 
We can regiment these rough characterizations as follows:
The Global Argument from Evil (p. 56)
(1) We fi nd vast amounts of truly horrendous evil in the world.
(2) If there were a God, we should not fi nd vast amounts of truly hor-
rendous evil in the world.
(3) Therefore, there is no God.
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The Local Argument from Evil (pp. 97–98)8
(1) A particular horror, H, in fact occurred.9
(2) If H had not occurred, the world would be no worse than it is.
(3) If a morally perfect creator could have left  a certain horror out of 
the world he created, and if the world he created would have been 
no worse if that horror had been left  out of it than it would have 
been if it had included that horror, then the morally perfect creator 
would have left  the horror out of the world he created if he had 
been able to do so.
(4) If an omnipotent being created the world, then he was able to leave 
H out of the world.
(5) So, if an omnipotent and morally perfect being created the world, 
then he would have left  H out of the world. (by 2, 3, and 4)
(6) Therefore, there is no omnipotent, morally perfect creator. That is, 
there is no God. (by 1 and 5)10
Interestingly, as van Inwagen points out, a satisfactory response to the 
global argument will not automatically be a satisfactory response to any 
particular local argument. To see this, note that even if one is able to tell 
a plausible story according to which God is blameless for allowing vast 
amounts of evil, this story will not automatically double as a plausible 
story according to which God is blameless for allowing a particular horror 
H to occur. Perhaps the world had to contain vast amounts of evil. But did 
it have to contain H (pp. 8–9)? Indeed, van Inwagen responds to the global 
argument in a much diﬀ erent way than to the local argument. In response 
to the former, he oﬀ ers a particular version of the well-known free-will 
defense to cast doubt on premise (2).11 His response to the local argument 
is particularly novel. He denies premise (3) by appealing to considerations 
of vagueness.
III. The Global Argument from Evil
Although we will focus our discussion on the local argument from evil, 
it will be useful to give a brief overview of van Inwagen’s response to the 
global argument from evil so as to bett er situate our criticism. Recall that 
the global argument from evil starts from the undeniable fact that there 
is a vast amount of evil in the world.12 It then asserts that there should 
not be a vast amount of evil in the world if God exists, and ends with the 
atheistic conclusion. Many philosophers have addressed this general sort 
of argument from evil by appealing to considerations of free will, and van 
Inwagen’s response belongs to this tradition.
Van Inwagen oﬀ ers a defense against this argument, which is to be dis-
tinguished from a theodicy. Whereas a theodicy is a story that one thinks 
expresses the truth about why God allows a vast amount of evil, a defense 
is a more modest project. The proponent of a defense need not actually 
believe that the story he tells expresses the truth of the matt er. Rather, the 
proponent of a defense needs only to tell a plausible and epistemically pos-
sible (i.e., true for all anyone knows) story that explains why God would 
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allow a vast amount of evil. Van Inwagen says that the reaction he hopes 
to elicit in an ideal agnostic with his defense is the following: “Given that 
God exists, the rest of the story might well be true. I can’t see any reason 
to rule it out” (p. 66). Such a reaction is tantamount to an admission that 
for all one knows, one of the premises of the global argument from evil 
is false. And for the ideal agnostic to admit this much is, as we have seen, 
enough to conclude that the global argument from evil is a failure.
So van Inwagen tells us a story: God created the world and “guided 
the course of evolution so as eventually to produce certain very clever 
primates, the immediate predecessors of Homo sapiens” (p. 85). God mi-
raculously raised these primates to rationality and gave them the gift  of 
free will, not least of all because free will is necessary for love. But these 
creatures abused their free will and separated themselves from God. As 
van Inwagen says, “The result was horrifi c” (p. 86). Gradually more and 
more evil came into the world as a result of this separation from God. A 
god who was merely merciful would have just wiped out human beings 
altogether, to put us out of our misery. But God is more than merciful; he 
is also loving. So God came up with a plan for our salvation that includes 
this essential feature: “Its object is to bring it about that human beings 
once more love God” (p. 87). But since love requires free will, humans 
must freely choose to love God once more. And humans will only be mo-
tivated to freely turn to God if they realize what it means to be separated 
from God. So God must leave in place a vast amount of evil. If the amount 
of evil in the world were less than vast, so to speak, God’s plan of atone-
ment would be frustrated.
There is much more to this story in van Inwagen’s book, and it is cer-
tainly worthy of consideration, as it is a considerably expanded and so-
phisticated version of the traditional free-will defense. But we’ve told 
enough of it to serve our purposes. The global argument from evil is a 
failure because, upon hearing this story, an ideal agnostic would say to 
herself, “Given that God exists, this story might well be true. And thus 
premise (2) of the global argument from evil might well be false.” In the 
next two sections we will see how van Inwagen responds to the local ar-
gument from evil, and how his response paves the way to a third, and 
equally troubling, argument from evil.
IV. The Local Argument from Evil
Recall that according to the local argument from evil, it is the occurrence 
of some particular horror, H, that gets us to the conclusion that God 
doesn’t exist. In philosophical treatments of the local argument, for ex-
ample, there has been much discussion of William Rowe’s example of a 
fawn that died an agonizing death in a forest fi re that was not caused, in 
any way, by human beings and whose death is not observed by any hu-
man and leaves no trace.13 The following quotation provides us with a 
concise explication of van Inwagen’s strategy of response, although it will 
take some work to unpack:
Even if no good came of [H], the occurrence of that event does not 
tell against the existence of an omnipotent, morally perfect being; for 
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it may be that the omnipotent morally perfect Creator of the world 
was morally required to draw a morally arbitrary line through the 
set of threatened evils, and that [H] fell on the ‘actuality’ side of the 
particular line he chose. (pp. 124–25)14
The basic idea here is that even if it is true that God could have left  H 
out of the world without thereby making the world a worse place than 
it actually is, it doesn’t follow that he would have left  H out, because he 
had to draw some line to separate the horrors that made it into the world 
from those that didn’t, and where he drew the line was arbitrary. And if 
the place at which the line gets drawn is arbitrary, then it’s inappropriate 
to blame the person who draws the line on the grounds that this particu-
lar horror falls on this side of the line, rather than on that side. He had 
to draw it somewhere, and no bett er there than here. But let’s unpack this 
some more.
According to van Inwagen, the best way to respond to any particular 
local argument from evil is to reject the moral principle that underlies 
premise (3). Recall premise (3) from above:
(3) If a morally perfect creator could have left  a certain horror out of 
the world he created, and if the world he created would have been 
no worse if that horror had been left  out of it than it would have 
been if it had included that horror, then the morally perfect creator 
would have left  the horror out of the world he created if he had 
been able to do so.
Van Inwagen says that there is only “one moral principle that it would be 
plausible to appeal to in defense of premise (3),” and he states it as follows:
(P) If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow 
that evil to occur—not unless allowing it to occur would result in 
some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in 
some other evil at least as bad. (p. 100)
The problem, however, is that (P) is surely false. Van Inwagen fi rst pres-
ents a simple counterexample to the principle, and then goes on to extract 
even deeper problems that the principle leads to. It will be helpful for our 
purposes to go through both of these steps. Van Inwagen presents the fol-
lowing counterexample to (P):
Suppose you are an oﬃ  cial who has the power to release anyone 
from prison at any time. Blodgett  has been sentenced to ten years in 
prison for felonious assault. His sentence is nearing its end, and he 
petitions you to release him from prison a day early. Should you? 
Well, the principle says so. A day spent in prison is an evil—if you 
don’t think so, I invite you to spend a day in prison. . . . Let’s suppose 
that the only good that results from someone’s being in prison is the 
deterrence of crime. Obviously 9 years and 364 days spent in prison 
is not going to have a signifi cantly diﬀ erent power to deter felonious 
assault from 10 years spent in prison. So: no good will be secured by 
visiting on Blodgett  that last day in prison, and that last day spent in 
prison is an evil. The principle tells you, the oﬃ  cial, to let him out a 
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day early. This much, I think, is enough to show that the principle is 
wrong, for you have no such obligation. (p. 101)
And of course nothing in this counterexample turns on the specifi c num-
bers van Inwagen chose. If his choices don’t sound convincing, think of a 
criminal sentenced to fi ft y years who petitions to be released a day early. 
Or even a criminal sentenced to fi ft y years who petitions to be released 
six hours early. If, in any of those circumstances, you aren’t obligated to 
release the criminal early, then (P) is false.
Although this is enough to show that (P) is false and thus that premise 
(3) should be rejected, a closer examination of this counterexample will 
prove enlightening. What could explain our intuition that we aren’t re-
quired to release Blodgett  from prison one day early? Here van Inwagen’s 
idea is that the length of time used for prison terms is largely arbitrary, 
and indeed must be largely arbitrary given the fact that there are many 
spans of time available for the picking that are so similar that choosing 
one or the other could not possibly make a moral diﬀ erence. Van Inwa-
gen rightly points out that the lengths of our prison sentences are partly 
dependent on things like “accidents of astronomy” and “our preference 
for numbers that can be specifi ed concisely” (p. 102). We don’t sentence 
criminals to 9 years and 364 days in prison. Is this because there is some 
important moral diﬀ erence secured by adding that extra day? Not at all. 
We just like our round numbers. In deciding the lengths of prison terms, 
there are many morally equivalent places at which we could draw the line. 
But—and here’s the important point—we must draw the line somewhere, 
and where we draw it will be to some extent morally arbitrary. As van In-
wagen puts it, “the principle fails precisely because it forbids the drawing 
of morally arbitrary lines” (p. 102).
Another way to put the point is in terms of a sorites paradox. Let n 
be the number of days Blodgett  will spend in prison, and suppose that 
being in prison for n days has a certain power to deter felonious assault. 
Surely spending n-1 days in prison will not be signifi cantly diﬀ erent with 
respect to its power to deter felonious assault. So if (P) is true, then you are 
required to let Blodgett  out of prison aft er n-1 days in prison. But n could 
be any number at all. Suppose n is 1,000. Surely 999 days in prison is not 
signifi cantly diﬀ erent with respect to its power to deter felonious assault. 
Again, if (P) is true, then you must release Blodgett  from prison aft er 999 
days. But given that 999 days in prison has suﬃ  cient power to deter felo-
nious assault, surely 998 is not signifi cantly diﬀ erent in this respect. Thus, 
(P) mandates that you must let Blodgett  out of prison aft er 998 days. And 
so on. As van Inwagen puts it, “A moment’s refl ection shows that . . . the 
moral principle entails that Blodgett  ought to spend no time in prison at 
all” (p. 101). But this is surely absurd, and thus (P) is false.
When construed in this way, the problem with (P) is that it fails to recog-
nize the inherently vague nature of a predicate like ‘has the power to deter 
felonious assault’. The fact is that there is no precise number of days such 
that a prison sentence of exactly that length would have the power to deter 
felonious assault whereas a prison sentence that is one day shorter would 
not have the power to deter felonious assault. There just is no such sharp 
cutoﬀ . And without a sharp cutoﬀ  to stop the sorites march, (P) leads us 
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to the conclusion that we should reduce Blodgett ’s prison sentence to 0 
days. Again, this is surely the wrong conclusion to draw, and so (P) must 
be rejected. Even when making explicitly moral judgments and decisions, 
we sometimes need the freedom to draw morally arbitrary lines, and it is 
precisely this freedom that (P) denies us.
Given the plausible supposition that premise (3) of the local argument 
from evil relies on (P), we can resist the conclusion of the local argument 
from evil by rejecting (P), and (3) along with it. For any particular hor-
ror, H, God is not required to eliminate H because there was a morally 
arbitrary line to be drawn between the horrors God would allow and the 
horrors God wouldn’t allow, and the place God chose to draw it happened 
to entail that H would be one of the horrors that God would allow. (Recall 
that part of van Inwagen’s response to the global argument from evil is that 
God must allow a vast amount of horrors in any case.)
Although we have some residual worries about this defense, let’s grant 
its success for now. That is, let’s grant that in some sense, there was a mor-
ally arbitrary line to be drawn between horrors that God would allow to 
exist and horrors that God would preclude from existence, and it had to 
be drawn somewhere. And let’s grant that this fact is reason enough to re-
ject (P) and thus reason enough to reject premise (3) of the local argument 
from evil. The local argument from evil, therefore, is a failure. Moreover, 
let’s grant that the global argument from evil is a failure, too, given van 
Inwagen’s expanded version of the free-will defense.
It seems to us that even if we grant all of this, the problem of evil still 
hasn’t been laid to rest. That is, we don’t think that the global and local 
arguments from evil exhaust the possible atheistic arguments one could 
mount against the existence of God under the general rubric of the prob-
lem of evil. There is a third argument from evil that van Inwagen has yet 
to consider, and it is van Inwagen’s discussion of the local argument of evil 
that brings this third argument to the fore.
V. The Range Argument from Evil
To see what this third argument looks like, let’s consider what the theist 
has accomplished in establishing the failure of the global and local argu-
ments from evil. This will help us see what the theist has yet to accom-
plish. A successful response to the global argument from evil provides an 
adequate explanation of why God would allow a vast amount of evil to 
exist in the world. And a successful response to any particular local argu-
ment from evil provides an adequate explanation of why, for any particu-
lar horror H, God would allow H to occur. So far so good. But even aft er all 
of this is said and done, something remains to be explained.
What remains to be explained is the particular amount of evil that ex-
ists in our world. Granted, it has to be vast. But must it be as vast as it 
is? Granted, if we pick any particular horror, there’s no case to be made 
that this horror alone seals the case against the existence of God, because 
a morally arbitrary line had to be drawn. But what if we take a group 
of horrors considered together? Couldn’t a case be made that the world 
could still have contained a reasonably vast amount of evil even if it didn’t 
include these particular horrors? And might it be plausible to suppose 
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that the inclusion of all of the horrors in this set takes us out of the range 
of reasonable vastness and into the range of overkill?
Let’s begin to regiment the intuitions that these rhetorical questions 
att empt to capture. First, let us fl esh out the notions of reasonable range 
and overkill. Consider a non-theistic example that includes the justifi ed 
drawing of arbitrary lines, such as sett ing the speed limit on a particu-
lar stretch of road in a residential area. Typically (in the U.S. anyway), 
the speed limit on a residential road is set at 25 miles per hour. Given 
facts such as that children oft en play along residential roads and that the 
houses lining the road are quite close to it, 25 mph seems a reasonable 
choice. And we can easily think of other choices that would not be rea-
sonable—for instance, 80 mph at one extreme and 2 mph at the other. But 
to choose precisely 25 mph as the speed limit is to some extent arbitrary. 
Why not 26 or 24? Perhaps there is no reason at all other than the fact that 
we all like numbers that end in ‘5’ much bett er than numbers that end in 
‘6’ or ‘4’ (and the perhaps related fact that speed-limit signs are printed 
this way).
But to say that 25 mph is to some extent an arbitrary choice is not to 
say that it is a wholly arbitrary choice. Aft er all, there are speeds that are 
clearly inappropriate choices for this particular stretch of road—80 mph 
and 2 mph, for instance. The existence of unreasonable speeds is enough 
to show that the choice of 25 mph is not wholly arbitrary. But, as we have 
said, it is partly arbitrary because there are speeds that are clearly as appro-
priate as 25 mph for this particular stretch of road—24 mph and 26 mph, 
for instance. That the people who legislate speed limits decided on 25 mph 
rather than 26 mph most likely has no interesting or signifi cant explana-
tion. So it looks like there is some reasonable range of speed limits such that 
each speed in this range is equally appropriate for this particular stretch of 
road as any other speed in the range. But the reasonable range has limits 
(though perhaps not precise limits)—80 mph is clearly outside this range. 
80 mph is overkill.
Now suppose that whatever committ ee decided on 25 mph as the speed 
limit for this road is asked to defend its choice against two challenges. The 
fi rst challenge asks the committ ee to explain why the speed limit needs to 
be set at any high number at all instead of, say, 2 mph? The second chal-
lenge asks the committ ee to explain why the speed limit needs to be set at 
the particular high number of 25 mph instead of, say, 24 mph? It should be 
obvious what the committ ee will say in each case.
Against the fi rst challenge, the committ ee will point out that part of the 
idea behind any sort of infrastructure is that it is meant to help people get 
to where they are going. If drivers went 2 mph on every road, the infra-
structure would not be functioning properly. Speed limits need to be set 
at some relatively high number so that traﬃ  c can actually fl ow rather than 
crawl. Car traﬃ  c is meant to be faster than pedestrian traﬃ  c, and so speed 
limits must be set comparatively high.
Against the second challenge, the committ ee will point out that their 
choice was to some extent arbitrary. Why not 24? No particular reason 
other than, perhaps, the fact that most car speedometers are graduated in 
increments of 5 mph (and readily available speed-limit signs are printed 
this way). Why not 26? Same answer. But of course some choice had to be 
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made, and so the committ ee selected 25 mph, despite its partly arbitrary 
nature. This is perfectly within their province.15
So the committ ee has easily defended its choice of 25 mph against both 
challenges. But isn’t it clear in this case that there is a remaining challenge 
to be raised? Suppose a coalition of concerned residents were to get to-
gether and present the following argument to the committ ee:
We understand that the speed limit must be set at a relatively high 
number given the point of infrastructure. And we understand why 
you are justifi ed in choosing 25 mph over 24 mph or 26 mph, given 
the partly arbitrary nature of the choice you had to make. But surely 
what makes your choice of 25 mph only partly (as opposed to wholly) 
arbitrary is the fact that you must have fi rst selected (in some non-
arbitrary way) a particular reasonable range of speeds from which to 
make your arbitrary choice. Given a particular reasonable range, say, 
from 20 mph to 30 mph, any choice you make is indeed wholly arbi-
trary. But this is on the assumption that you’ve already fi gured out 
what the reasonable range is. And what we are wondering now is: 
Why did you choose the particular range you did? And what makes 
that range reasonable?
Now, we suspect that the committ ee will have a response to this challenge, 
as well, and it will most likely have to do with some complicated statistics 
from which it can be shown that sett ing residential speed limits at, say, 60 
or 50 or 40, is a prett y bad idea. But it is important to see that this challenge 
is indeed distinct from the fi rst two challenges we discussed. An answer 
to one of the fi rst challenges will not ipso facto be an answer to this current 
challenge.
Let’s leave our story about speed limits, and head back into the theistic 
realm. We hope that the parallel is fairly easy to see. The global and local 
arguments from evil, as van Inwagen has presented them, can be captured 
by the following two questions (perhaps directed at God):
Global: Why is there a vast amount of evil in the world?
Local: Why does the world include this particular horror?
Van Inwagen has ably provided answers to these questions on God’s be-
half. But it should be clear that there is a third question he hasn’t provided 
an answer to, namely: Why does the amount of evil in the world fall in 
the particular range that it in fact does? Call the argument that this ques-
tion captures The Range Argument from Evil. The argument can be stated 
as follows:
(1) If there were a God, the amount of evil in the world would fall 
within a reasonable range.
(2) But the amount of evil in the world surely falls within the overkill 
range.
(3) Therefore, there is no God.
Let’s look closely at the premises here, starting with premise (1). The les-
son that van Inwagen taught us with his response to the global argument 
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from evil is that perhaps the world has to include a vast amount of suﬀ er-
ing in order for God’s plan of atonement to succeed. But of course there is 
vastness and then there is vastness. Given that God’s goal in allowing evil 
is to ensure the success of his plan of atonement (as van Inwagen’s defense 
has it), there will surely be a measure of vastness that is far beyond what 
is absolutely necessary for the plan to succeed. This is not to say that there 
will be some precise number of evils that separates the ‘vast enough’ and the 
‘too vast’ categories, though. It is merely to say that there is such a thing as a 
‘too vast’ category in the fi rst place.16 And it is plausible to think that God 
would not include in the world any amount of evil that falls into that cat-
egory. Not only would such an amount be unnecessary for the success of 
God’s plan of atonement, it would be unreasonably unnecessary, as it were, 
or unnecessary in the extreme. 
The need to draw a morally arbitrary line through those evils to allow 
into existence and those to preclude guarantees that there will be some 
amounts of evil that are strictly speaking unnecessary for God’s plan of 
atonement. But some of those unnecessary amounts would have been just 
as reasonable for God to have chosen to include, and some would have 
been unreasonable for God to have chosen to include. Analogously, the 
need to draw an arbitrary line through the numbers at which the commit-
tee could possibly set the speed limit guarantees that there will be some 
speed limits that are strictly speaking unnecessary for the success of the 
committ ee’s plan to manage infrastructure eﬃ  ciently. But some of those 
unnecessary amounts would have been just as reasonable for the com-
mitt ee to have chosen (such as 26 mph), and some would have been un-
reasonable (such as 80 mph). Premise (1) of the Range Argument merely 
states that an all-powerful, all-loving creator would have drawn the line at 
an amount of evil that, while perhaps strictly speaking unnecessary, was 
at least reasonably unnecessary.
Premise (2) goes on to assert that the actual amount of evil in the world 
is so vast that it must fall into the range of the unreasonably unnecessary—
the overkill range. How might one defend this premise? At fi rst it may 
seem that this is exactly where the Range Argument from Evil is much 
weaker than its siblings. Aft er all, in both the global and local arguments 
from evil, the premise about the actual evil in the world is indisputable. 
The global argument merely asserts that there is a vast amount of evil, 
and the local argument merely points to an actual instance of evil. Neither 
claim is controversial. The Range Argument, on the other hand, makes a 
more substantive claim about the nature of the evil in the world, namely 
that it falls into the ‘too vast’ category. And it’s hard to see how an athe-
ist could plausibly argue that the amount of evil in the world is far more 
than is reasonably necessary for God’s plan of atonement. Nevertheless, 
we think the atheist has a plausible way to make his case.
A suggestion we made above was that the Range Argument from Evil 
could be made vivid by considering a set of horrors, rather than by con-
sidering any single instance of a horror. If the set were suﬃ  ciently large, 
it seems that a case could be made for the claim that God’s including all 
the members of that set of horrors brings the actual amount of evil out of 
the reasonable range and into the overkill range. Granted, the elimina-
tion of a single horror from that set wouldn’t make a morally relevant 
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diﬀ erence, but perhaps the elimination of all of the horrors in that set 
would. So let’s consider a particularly large set of evils: those that con-
stitute the Holocaust. The Holocaust is not one horror, at least not on 
any plausible way of individuating horrors. Rather, the Holocaust is a 
collection of millions, probably billions, of horrors. Couldn’t someone 
plausibly address God as follows:
I know that in order for your plan of atonement to succeed, the world 
must contain a vast amount of evil. I also know that for any par-
ticular horror I choose, your choice to include that horror may just 
have been the result of your drawing a morally arbitrary line. But 
what about the Holocaust? Did the world really need to include the 
Holocaust, with its billions of horrors? Surely a world without the 
Holocaust would still have contained a vast amount of evil—plenty 
to ensure the success of your plan of atonement. So doesn’t it seem 
that including the Holocaust is just overkill? 
We submit that the theist needs a defense against this charge and, signifi -
cantly, neither van Inwagen’s defense against the global argument nor the 
defense against the local argument will work in this case.
To bring out the problem in a slightly diﬀ erent way, consider what van 
Inwagen says about the context of distributive justice and taxation:
we might easily fi nd ourselves in a moral situation . . . in which we 
must draw an arbitrary line and allow some bad thing to happen 
when we could have prevented it, and in which, moreover, no good 
whatever comes of our allowing it to happen. In fact, we do fi nd 
ourselves in this situation. In a welfare state, for example, we use 
taxation to divert money from its primary economic role in order to 
spend it to prevent or alleviate various social evils. And how much 
money, what proportion of the gross national product, shall we—
that is, the state—divert for this purpose? Well, not none of it and not 
all of it (enforcing a tax rate of 100 percent on all earned income and 
all profi ts would be the same as not having a money economy at all). 
And where we draw the line is an arbitrary matt er. However much 
we spend on social services, we shall always be able to fi nd some 
person or family who would be saved from misery if the state spent 
(in the right way) a mere £1000 more than it in fact plans to spend. 
And the state can always fi nd another £1000, and can fi nd it without 
damaging the economy or doing any other sort of harm. (p. 108)
It is indisputable that where we draw the line is an arbitrary matt er in the 
sense relevant to van Inwagen’s response to the Local Argument from Evil: 
as he points out, wherever the state draws the line, we can always save an-
other family from misery by taxing people just a bit more and providing 
more money. But it should also be absolutely clear that it is not an arbitrary 
matt er whether the income tax rate is set at 5 percent or 15 percent; that 
is, even granting van Inwagen’s point, we could still think that it makes 
a non-arbitrary—indeed a signifi cant—moral diﬀ erence whether the tax 
rate is in one range (around 5 percent) or another (around 15 percent). To 
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suppose that the latt er issue is an arbitrary matt er would be to consign 
much of the philosophical debate about distributive justice to the fl ames, 
and it is just manifestly false that it is morally arbitrary whether the state 
engages in minimal or more substantial redistributive taxation. (This is of 
course not to prejudge the substantive issue of what is just in this context; 
it is simply to point out that it is a substantive moral issue.)
Conclusion
In this book van Inwagen oﬀ ers a sustained and ingenious argument for 
the view that the problem of evil is a philosophical failure. There is much 
to be learned from the resourceful argumentation. One might think that 
the interest of the conclusion that the problem of evil is a philosophi-
cal failure is at least somewhat vitiated by van Inwagen’s view that all 
philosophical arguments for interesting and substantive conclusions are 
failures; perhaps van Inwagen would say that it is important to see why 
the members of this particular family of arguments are failures, even 
if all philosophical arguments for the relevant sorts of conclusions are 
indeed failures. On this sort of approach, one could view philosophy 
in general as showing why exactly each philosophical argument for the 
various interesting philosophical theses fails; although this is perhaps a 
somewhat less than perky vision, it would still leave an interesting role 
for philosophical argumentation.
We have suggested some alternative models of philosophical argumen-
tation, by reference to which not all philosophical arguments would be 
deemed failures. Also, we have suggested that van Inwagen has not put 
the problem of evil to rest. Even if he has pointed toward the inadequacies 
of the global and local arguments, the range argument remains. So even 
if it is an arbitrary matt er whether to set the speed limit at 25 mph or 24 
mph, it is obviously not an arbitrary matt er whether to set it at 25 mph or 
45 mph. And even if it is morally arbitrary whether to set the income tax 
rate at 5 percent or 4 percent, it is surely not morally arbitrary whether 
to set it at 5 percent or 15 percent. Similarly, one could surely wonder 
why God created a world with so much evil? Isn’t this overkill? No doubt 
there are various possible answers, but van Inwagen’s defenses against 
the global and local versions of the problem of evil do not in themselves 
provide an answer.17
University of California, Riverside
NOTES
1. The Problem of Evil. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); xiv + 183 pp. (We 
refer in parentheses to page numbers of this book throughout the text of this 
paper.)
2. See, for example, John Martin Fischer, “Frankfurt-Type Compatibil-
ism,” in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. S. Buss 
and L. Overton (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002): pp. 1–26; reprinted in Free 
Will: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Second Edition, ed. G. Watson (Oxford 
A CRITICAL NOTICE OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 473
University Press, 2003): pp. 190–211, and John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays 
on Moral Responsibility (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 
pp. 124–42.
3. Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna, “Dialectical Delicacies in the 
Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” Journal of Philosophy 101 
(2004): pp. 299–314; and “Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic 
Contexts: A Reply to Palmer,” Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006): pp. 363–72; and 
Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).
4. In footnote 5, Chapter (Lecture) 3, on page 160, van Inwagen says:
[my model] of philosophical success and failure has the same conse-
quence as the two criteria I have rejected: most if not all arguments for 
substantive philosophical conclusions are failures. And this was the con-
sequence that was my reason for rejecting those criteria. Should I not, 
for just this reason, reject the proposed criterion and look for some more 
liberal criterion? Alas, there is no more liberal criterion. The criterion 
I have proposed is the most liberal possible criterion. . . . My position, 
then, is that, sadly, every known argument for a substantive philosophi-
cal position is a failure—by the most liberal (by the most possibility-of-
success-friendly) possible criterion of success and failure.
We are not sure why van Inwagen believes that his suggested model is the 
most liberal possible. In the text above, we suggested a liberalization accord-
ing to which proponents of competing positions may change the level of cer-
tainty or credence they place in their beliefs (rather than requiring them to 
give up their antecedent views and adopt the alternative view). Additionally, 
we develop another sort of liberalization of van Inwagen’s model in the text 
below.
5. Here we have benefi ted from very helpful discussion on the blog, “The 
Garden of Forking Paths”: htt p://gfp.typepad.com; see the post, “So A Myste-
rianist and a Semi-Compatibilist Walk Into a Bar . . . ,” January 18, 2007.
6. Here is an amusing (and also very realistic) view about success in phil-
osophical argumentation:
Recently I had lunch with a graduate student at the APA. During the 
lunch I presented an argument for compatibilism. The student works in 
ethics and epistemology but does no work on free will. By the end of the 
lunch she claimed that she no longer thought that compatibilism was a 
crazy view. I thought that my argument was a huge success! I generally 
think that I’ve done a good job if I can convince a few students in my 
undergraduate metaphysics class that compatibilism is not a crazy view. 
(Joseph Campbell, “So A Mysterianist and a Semi-Compatibilist Walk 
Into a Bar,” htt p://gfp.typepad.com, discussion thread.)
7. Van Inwagen is never explicit about why he fi nds the traditional dis-
tinction useless, but what is interesting is that part of his response to the glob-
al argument from evil actually doubles as a response to the traditional logical 
argument from evil. Indeed, the initial response he has his theist make to the 
global argument from evil includes this statement: “The conclusion that evil 
does not exist does not, therefore, follow logically from the premises that the 
non-existence of evil is what God wants and that he is able to bring about the 
object of his desire—since, for all logic can tell us, God might have reasons 
for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability of the 
non-existence of evil” (p. 65). Perhaps since this is included in the theist’s very 
474 Faith and Philosophy
fi rst response to the global argument from evil, van Inwagen thinks that the 
logical argument from evil so obviously fails that it isn’t worth discussing on 
its own.
8. Strictly speaking, what follows is just the general structure of any par-
ticular local argument from evil, abstracted from van Inwagen’s presentation 
in the text.
9. A horror, as van Inwagen uses the term, is just a “certain particular 
very bad event” (p. 95).
10. This presentation of the local argument follows van Inwagen’s in the 
text, though we have added the “suitably chosen additional premises” needed 
to make the argument formally valid. See p. 98.
11. On the free-will defense, see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1977).
12. Van Inwagen tells us that the word ‘evil’ in this context just means ‘bad 
things’ (p. 4).
13. William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Athe-
ism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): pp. 335–41. See also the simi-
lar example of the baby bat due to John Perry in his Dialogue on Good, Evil, and 
the Existence of God (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett  Publishing Co., 1999) p. 49.
14. We have lift ed this quotation from the lecture in which van Inwagen 
discusses the “suﬀ erings of beasts,” although this particular quotation clearly 
expresses his strategy of responding to the local argument from the suﬀ erings 
of humans, as well. 
15. Perhaps this also explains—what is now a matt er of common belief, 
whether true or not—the alleged fact that a police oﬃ  cer won’t pull you over 
for speeding unless you are traveling at least 3 or 4 mph over the limit.
16. A word of warning. We need to be careful when talking about ranges, 
lest we fall away from “the bright world of good sense” (p. 108) into thinking 
that there are sharp cutoﬀ s governing vague predicates, as epistemicists about 
vagueness think. Our discussion of reasonable and overkill ranges may make 
it seem that we are illegitimately supposing that there will be a sharp cutoﬀ  
between, say, the amount of evil at the upper limit of the reasonable range and 
the amount of evil at the lower limit of the overkill range. But our argument 
requires no such supposition. Let the upper and lower limits of the ranges 
be fuzzy, if you like. All the argument requires is that there are clear cases of 
amounts that fall within the boundaries of each range.
17. For helpful discussion of these issues, we are grateful to Mary Am-
schel, Chris Franklin, James Gibson, William Hasker, Robert Sanchez, Patrick 
Todd, and Howard Wett stein.
